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Reciprocity in the Formation of Intergenerational Coresidence 
 
Abstract 
Children play a key role in supporting elderly parents, and the literature has consistently 
found reciprocity whereby parents compensate their children for providing care and 
attention. To understand how the mode of compensation is related to the characteristics 
of parents and children, we studied the determinants of transitions to parent-child 
coresidence in Japan. The results conformed to the hypothesis that the mode of 
reciprocity depends on the costs and benefits of coresidence for each family member. 
Parental assets and care needs were associated with coresidence. Additionally, 
transitions to coresidence with married parents were characterized by young, unmarried 
children and the presence of parental housing assets, whereas transitions to coresidence 
with widowed mothers were characterized by mothers’ non-housing assets. 
 
Keywords: transition analysis, latent class model, informal care, parent-child 
coresidence, aged care. 
JEL codes: I10, J14.   
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In aging societies, care and attention provided by adult children remains an important 
source of support in old age. Although the demand for aged care in general is growing 
at an unprecedented rate, in the early 2000s, approximately 80% of the hours of care 
were provided informally, with children providing 41% of all informal care in the US, 
43% in the UK, and 60% in Japan (OECD 2005). Informal care places a heavy burden 
on children mentally, physically, and economically, especially in modern societies in 
which the elderly live longer with disabilities, families have fewer children, and each 
generation lives more independently compared with previous generations (e.g., 
Carmichael et al. 2010; Fast et al. 1999; Hall et al. 2007). Not surprisingly, the 
provision of informal care by children is not “unconditional.” As the burden increases, 
parents may need to increase compensation for care provision. Indeed, the literature has 
accumulated evidence on the reciprocal nature of intergenerational transfers between 
elderly parents and their adult children (Bernheim et al. 1985; Chan 2005; Cox 1987; 
Henretta et al. 1997; Horioka 2002; Johar and Maruyama 2011; Kim 2004; Koh and 
Macdonald 2006; Nakamura and Maruyama 2012; Norton and Van Houtven 2006; 
Tabuchi 2008; Takagi and Silverstein 2011; Yamada 2006). 
Parents can compensate their children for the provision of care and attention in 
various ways. Bernheim et al. (1985) found that parents used their bequeathable wealth 
as an incentive to induce their children to provide care and attention. Norton and Van 
Houtven (2006) proposed that inter vivos transfers were better suited to inducing 
exchanges than bequests. In addition to monetary transfers, deeding a house to children 
was found to be an important means of making an inter vivos transfer to secure care 
from children (Henretta et al. 1997). A study on living arrangements by Brown et al. 
(2002) found that unmarried adult children were more likely to coreside with their 
3 
parents, suggesting economic support from parents to children in a shared household. 
Non-monetary time-related services may be another channel of transfers; in particular, 
parents can reward children by providing childcare for grandchildren (Kim 2004; Wolff 
2001; Yamada 2006).1 However, very little is known about the way these channels are 
chosen. 
To advance the literature, we explored how the mode of compensation is related 
to the characteristics of parents and children. To our knowledge, no study has examined 
the conditions for intergenerational coresidence for elderly parents in different health 
and economic situations or examined how widowhood and parental health alter the 
reciprocal nature of intergenerational coresidence. Detailed knowledge about the nature 
of reciprocity between elderly parents and adult children could have considerable policy 
implications in relation to public support for frail or disabled elderly parents and their 
families. 
To better understand how the mode of compensation is related to the 
characteristics of elderly parents and their children, we investigated the determinants of 
parent-child coresidence in Japan. We focused on intergenerational coresidence – a 
comprehensive form of hands-on care and support for elderly parents with a long-term 
commitment (Konrad et al. 2002; Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2009; Pezzin and Schone 
1999; Sloan et al. 2002; Wakabayashi and Horioka 2009; Yamada 2006). Especially in 
Japan, informal care provided by children has overlapped closely with parent-child 
                                                 
1 The literature has also noted that social norms and traditions might play a role in 
providing incentives for children to look after their parents (Takagi et al. 2007; 
Wakabayashi and Horioka 2009; Wolff 2001). 
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coresidence. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2008), for 
elderly Japanese receiving any nursing care, the most common primary caregiver was a 
coresident child or a coresident child’s spouse (32%); only 11% were cared for by non-
coresident family members.2 In addition, Japan retains one of the highest 
intergenerational coresidence rates among developed countries, thus providing ample 
observations for this study.3 
Using the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA), 
we investigated the determinants of the transition to coresidence by elderly Japanese 
parents and their children, building on demographic and sociological studies that focus 
on transitions in the living arrangements of the elderly (Brandon 2012; Brown et al. 
2002; Dostie and Léger 2005; Hays et al. 2003; Takagi et al. 2007). We applied binary 
choice models in which the dependent variable was whether an elderly parent without 
coresident children began coresidence with an adult child by the next observation point. 
Our definition of “the transition to coresidence” included all three possible cases: 
children moving in with parents, parents moving in with children, and both children and 
parents moving to begin living together. We did not distinguish among them because in 
                                                 
2Approximately 18% and 14% were cared for primarily by a coresident child and a 
coresident child’s spouse, respectively, whereas 25% were cared for primarily by a 
coresident spouse. 
3 We do not argue that intergenerational coresidence and aged care are equivalent. Aged 
care takes a variety of forms, including formal care, community care, and distant 
informal care. Neither do we advocate maintaining or promoting informal care by 
coresident children.  
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the vast majority of cases in Japan, elderly parents do not move and instead 
accommodate the child moving into their house. We exploited the detailed information 
in the NUJLSOA on elderly parents and their children. 
The focus on transition offers us two significant advantages. First, transition 
analysis provides a clearer interpretation of estimated relationships than cross-sectional 
analysis. For example, a cross-sectional association between coresidence and parental ill 
health may be explained by the effect of coresidence on health. Several studies reported 
that living arrangements influenced the health of the elderly, suggesting that a reverse 
causal effect may exist (e.g., Johar and Maruyama 2013; Maruyama 2012; Michael et 
al. 2001; Sarwari et al. 1998). Second, transition analysis provides a clearer framework 
to study the consequences of the heightened needs of elderly parents. Unlike a static 
framework, transition analysis allows us to exclude life-long coresidence in which a 
child has never left the parental home and to focus on new coresidence in which 
families that live independently start coresiding. These two types of intergenerational 
coresidence may arise from very different motives (Takagi et al. 2007). We focused on 
the transition to rather than the transition from coresidence because the latter is rare. 
We conducted two types of transition analysis. First, we estimated a conditional 
logit model to study the transition to coresidence for each parent-child pair. This child-
level analysis allowed us to investigate not only parental characteristics but also the 
characteristics of individual children that make them more likely to start coresidence 
with the parent relative to their siblings. We exploited the richness of the NUJLSOA 
data, which contains information about all children, whether coresident or non-
coresident. We estimated separate conditional logit models for the full sample and for 
sub-samples of married parents and widowed mothers. The latter has been a policy 
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target in many countries. The United Nations and the World Health Organization have 
characterized elderly women as individuals who typically live alone for a long period of 
time with scarce financial resources (WHO 2007). Knowledge about the compensation 
mechanism at work in this vulnerable population may aid in the design and 
implementation of a targeted welfare program. In the second part, we analyzed the 
transition to coresidence at the family level by employing a Heckman and Singer 
(1984)-type binary logit model with finite mixture components. This model identified 
latent types of families by an empirical distribution of the data rather than by a priori 
grouping (such as married and widowed parents). Although the information regarding 
each child was aggregated at the family level, this model allowed us to study 
unobserved family heterogeneity that may be related to the mode of compensation. This 
model also had the advantage of reducing potential attrition bias due to unobserved 
factors. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, our results are consistent with the widely 
documented reciprocity in intergenerational coresidence. On the one hand, the transition 
to coresidence is often associated with parents’ health deterioration and the loss of a 
spouse, confirming that coresidence is motivated by parental care needs. On the other 
hand, our estimates underscore the relevance of the costs and benefits of coresidence to 
children. On average, coresidence is more likely to start when a child is young and 
unmarried, lives nearby, and has small children and when a parent owns a house and 
possesses assets other than the house. 
Second, families engage in two distinct modes of reciprocity. The majority of 
families tend to start coresidence that involves young unmarried children and married 
parents. In this type of family, the main mode of intergenerational compensation 
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appears to be housing assets. The other type of family tends to start coresidence that 
involves a widowed parent, typically a widowed mother. This type of family has a 
higher tendency to start coresidence, and the primary mode of transfer is non-house 
wealth. For the parents of this group, wealth accumulation is important for safeguarding 
old age support. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the mode of 
reciprocity depends on the costs and benefits of coresidence to each family member. 
Data 
The data were derived from the NUJLSOA, a nationally representative survey of 
Japanese aged 65 and over. The survey was designed primarily to investigate the health 
status of the Japanese elderly and changes in health status over time and to provide data 
comparable to those collected in the US and other countries. The format of the initial 
questionnaire was created following the US Longitudinal Study of Aging II (LSOAII) 
and the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) sample 
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).4 The four waves of the survey were 
conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006, and new, younger individuals were recruited 
for each wave so that it remained representative of the population in each wave. In the 
first wave, the sample response rate was 74.6%, and the data set had 4,997 respondents. 
Wave 2 consisted of 4,623 observations. Of 4,997 respondents in Wave 1, 327 (6.5%) 
died by the next wave, 946 (18.9%) were lost, and 3,724 (74.5%) were interviewed 
again in Wave 2. Added to Wave 2 were 899 observations in the additional cohorts. The 
attrition rate became slightly higher in later waves due to the older sample. Waves 3 and 
4 had 4,507 and 3,414 respondents, respectively. 
                                                 
4 For details of the NUJLSOA, see http://www.usc.edu/dept/gero/CBPH/nujlsoa/.   
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[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 provides background information on the prevalence of the different types 
of living arrangements of the Japanese elderly. The first column, titled “all,” includes all 
elderly observations, and the figures in the other columns are based on elderly 
individuals with at least one surviving child. Living with a child was most common, 
with approximately 50% of elderly Japanese living with a child. The second most 
common living arrangement was living with a spouse only. Across waves, a steadily 
declining proportion of elderly parents lived with a child, and an increasing proportion 
of elderly parents lived either alone or with a spouse only.5 Married parents were more 
likely to live without children than were widowed parents. Widowed mothers were 
more likely to live with children than were widowed fathers. 
Table 2 shows the transition in living arrangements between waves. The large 
diagonal entries reflect the stability of the living arrangements of the elderly. The living 
arrangements during the period between 2003 and 2006 were less stable because this 
longer three-year interval led to higher probabilities of changes. For both singles and 
couples, living with a child tended to be associated with a higher probability of 
transitioning to death in comparison to living without a child. This observation 
highlights the important role children play in supporting sick or disabled elderly parents. 
From the states “living alone” and “spouse only,” the most common transitional change 
                                                 
5 The coresidence rate in Japan is also declining in the longer term. In 1986, among 
households with at least one elderly individual, 31% consisted of only one elderly 
individual or an elderly couple. This number steadily increased to 52% in 2007 
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2008). 
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other than death was to initiate living with a child by the next wave. The elderly parents 
living with “others” (i.e., individuals other than the spouse and children, such as 
siblings) were less likely to begin living with a child by the next wave, suggesting that 
there was no child available or willing to live with the parent. Among the different types 
of living arrangements, living with others was relatively unstable. This pattern indicates 
the different nature of parent-child and parent-other interactions, with the latter being 
relatively provisional and unstructured. 
[Table 2 here] 
The NUJLSOA asked elderly parents who began coresidence with a child within 
the previous two years the reasons for the coresidence, which is the main focus of this 
study. The question had multiple-choice responses, and parents could indicate more 
than one reason. The results reported in Table 3 highlight two important facts. First, we 
observed considerable heterogeneity across families. There were many common 
answers that were of a completely different nature and large gender differences. 
Specifically, compared to fathers, mothers were less likely to answer “It’s what I want” 
and “To financially support my child,” but they were more likely to answer “Being with 
my child supports me mentally” and “My spouse passed away.” Second, Table 3 
suggests a complex mixture of both parties’ interests rather than pure and one-sided 
altruism of children or parents. Further interpretation is difficult because responses were 
self-reports, multiple responses were allowed, and the meanings of some choices were 
ambiguous. Hence, we conducted a further quantitative analysis based on the revealed 
choice. Nevertheless, the two findings in this table – the considerable heterogeneity and 
reciprocity in intergenerational exchange – motivated the design of our empirical 
analysis below. 
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[Table 3 here] 
Our population of interest was elderly individuals aged 65 years and older with 
at least one surviving child. We used three comparison periods: 1999/2001, 2001/2003, 
and 2003/2006. Our population consisted of elderly parents who completed two 
consecutive surveys and had at least one surviving child in both surveys.6 The 
definition of a child included biological, step-, and adopted children, but not children-
in-law. This was because we did not have information on widowed children-in-law 
unless they lived with their parents-in-law and because the parental relationship with 
children-in-law is different in many aspects from the relationship with one’s own 
children (Hanaoka and Norton 2008). Furthermore, because our focus was on the 
transition to coresidence, we required that an elderly parent did not live with any child 
or child-in-law in the base year. We also restricted the sample to elderly parents who 
had no surviving parent throughout the period to avoid the complications of elderly 
parents who were also in the position of being a “child.” In addition, a few elderly 
parents who lived with someone other than a spouse, such as siblings, grandchildren 
(but not children), and other relatives, were excluded. We also excluded observations of 
those in a hospital or jail at any time during the period or those in a nursing home during 
the base year. Nursing homes are growing in Japan as in other developed countries, but 
                                                 
6 Hence, people who died before the second interview were not included in our analysis. 
This exclusion is a potential source of selection bias, particularly given that Table 2 
shows slightly higher mortality for those who lived with children compared to those 
who lived without children. However, this difference was small and unlikely to 
significantly affect our main conclusions. 
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the number of users in our data period was small. In our data, we observed the transition 
to a nursing home for less than 0.5% of elderly parents between two consecutive 
surveys. Those with critical missing values or inconsistent answers and those labeled by 
interviewers as “unreliable” respondents were also excluded.  
We conducted the analysis at two levels, the child level and the family level, as 
explained in the next section. For the family-level model, imposing the above 
restrictions led to a final sample of 3,513 elderly parent periods. In the child-level 
model, the sample was expanded due to multiple-child families. For example, a family 
with three children would have one observation in the family-level model in a given 
period and three observations in the child-level model. The final sample size was 9,140 
parent-period-child observations based on 2,841 family-period observations. The 
number of family-period observations in the child-level analysis was smaller than that in 
the family-level analysis because detailed information about every child was sometimes 
not available, and a small number of parents coresided with multiple children. We 
verified that our findings were robust with respect to this sample restriction. 
[Table 4 here] 
Our dependent variable was a binary variable for the transition of an elderly 
parent to coresidence between consecutive surveys. In the child-level analysis, 
C_CoresNext was a binary variable for starting coresidence by the next period with a 
particular child. In the family-level analysis, CoresNext was a binary variable for 
starting coresidence by the next period with at least one child in the family. 
Table 4 reports the sample size and frequency of the transition at the family level 
in the three periods. Between 1999 and 2006, 229 parent-period observations (6.5%) 
began coresidence. Of the parents who began coresidence, approximately 90% 
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accommodated the child who moved into their house. The remaining parents moved 
geographically.7  
Two sets of variables, parent and child characteristics, were used in the 
following analysis and are defined in Table 5. Their summary statistics are reported in 
Table 6. 
[Table 5 here] 
The parent characteristics included shock, health status, and socio-economic 
variables. The shock variables were dummy variables constructed to capture major 
negative events and health deterioration between two consecutive waves. These 
variables included the loss of a spouse, adverse health shocks in physical ability and in 
the ability to perform the activities of daily life (ADL), and deterioration in spousal 
ability to care for others. All explanatory variables except the shock variables were 
defined in terms of the base years.  
For parental health measures in the base year, we considered the ability to 
perform a series of activities. We constructed two indices, one for physical ability and 
another for the ability to perform ADL. Each index was constructed as an average of 
values between 0 and 10 that were assigned to individual tasks based on the level of 
difficulty. Each index was valued at 0 if all tasks could be performed without difficulty 
                                                 
7 This figure may be biased if the re-contact rate was significantly lower for those who 
moved. However, even using our most conservative estimates, the vast majority of 
parents (75-80%) who started coresidence did not move and accommodated children. 
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and at 10 if none of them was possible.8 We also included an index variable for 
subjective health. Although mental health and cognitive impairments were also likely 
determinants of coresidence, it was difficult to incorporate them because our data were 
self-reported. Individuals with severe impairments in mental health or cognitive ability 
were likely omitted from our sample because it would have been difficult for them to 
participate in the survey and because we excluded individuals reported as “unreliable” 
by the interviewers. Nevertheless, the effects of mental health and cognitive ability were 
captured to some degree by our measures of ADL and subjective health (Dodge et al. 
2005; Pinquart 2001). All health variables were defined such that they took smaller 
values when the parent was healthier and physically stronger. 
[Table 6 here] 
Parental demographic and economic characteristics may have affected 
coresidence because these characteristics indicate the degree of economic independence 
and support available from non-child sources. They may also have reflected the 
resources available to children. With regard to demographics, one of the most relevant 
variables was the presence of a spouse. Of the sampled elderly parents, 74.3% lived 
                                                 
8 Physical activities used to construct the index included (1) walking 200 or 300 meters; 
(2) climbing 10 stairs without resting; (3) standing for two hours; (4) continuing to sit 
for two hours; (5) squatting and kneeling; (6) raising hands above head; (7) extending 
arms out in front; (8) grasping with fingers or using fingers easily; and (9) lifting a 
heavy load of 10 kg. ADL included (1) taking a bath/shower; (2) dressing; (3) eating; 
(4) standing up from a bed or chair and sitting down; (5) walking around the house; (6) 
going outside; and (7) going to the bathroom. 
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with a spouse, and 5.4% of these married parents lost a spouse by the following wave 
(Table 6). The eldest-son status of the father is another family structure variable of 
interest for testing the significance of the primogenital family system in modern Japan. 
In Japanese tradition, the eldest son’s family is the main family that succeeds the family 
headship and is responsible for the family’s continuation. According to the format of the 
survey question, this eldest-son dummy variable was defined as whether the parent, or 
the spouse if the parent was a mother, was an eldest son. For economic variables, we 
included the current working status, the primary career occupation, and wealth. Given 
the limited information on wealth from the NUJLSOA, we used a dummy variable of 
house ownership. For those who owned a house, we estimated the value of the house 
using information on the land area of the house owned by the parent.9 Regarding other 
asset components, we constructed a dummy variable that indicated the possession of 
substantial non-house assets because the limited information did not allow us to 
compute an accurate wealth value. This variable covered real estate assets other than the 
                                                 
9 Because this land area information was available for Wave 2 and after, the land area 
for the Wave 1 sample was obtained from Wave 2. This approach required us to drop 
elderly parents who moved between Waves 1 and 2. The land price was constructed 
from a government source as an average land price of residential properties sampled in 
each municipal area (Public notice of land prices, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism). Assuming that the land price constituted approximately three-
quarters of house wealth (Ando et al. 1986), the total house wealth was computed as 
house wealth=land area  unit land price/0.75. When a parent lived in an owned house 
with a land-lease right, one-third of the land price was used as the house wealth. 
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house in which the parent lived, marketable securities (e.g., stocks, bonds, loan trusts), 
savings, and life insurance. The dummy variable took a value of one if the income of the 
parent, including spousal income, was above the median income and if one of the top 
two income sources was from one of the asset types listed above. Income was not 
included as an explanatory variable because in the NUJLSOA, income included 
withdrawal from savings, so its interpretation was unclear. In general, wealth was a 
more appropriate measure of the elderly’s economic status. 
The NUJLSOA provided child information regardless of whether a child lived 
with the parent. We included children’s age, family structure, years of education, 
geographical proximity to parents (whether living in the same municipality), health, and 
coresidence status with parents-in-law.  
Table 6 also reports the summary statistics by parental marital status and 
coresidence status. Compared with elderly couples, widowed mothers were more likely 
to be older, have less education, be out of the labor force, have more physical 
limitations, and have low house wealth. They were also more likely to live in a rented 
house or a family house that had already been bequeathed to a child. Turning to the 
comparison between those who started new coresidence and those who did not, on 
average, all shocks were observed more frequently for parents who started coresidence. 
These parents also tended to be older and have less education. In addition, Table 6 
highlights the differential contributions of health and economic factors to the transition 
to coresidence between married parents and widowed mothers. Married parents who 
started coresidence had more health limitations but had a greater tendency to work and 
owned better housing assets than non-coresiding married parents. In contrast, widowed 
mothers who started coresidence were healthier but were less likely to work and owned 
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more non-house assets than their non-coresiding counterparts.  
Empirical Strategy 
We conducted two econometric analyses. First, we estimated a conditional logit model 
at the child level utilizing the characteristic variables of each child. Second, we 
conducted a family-level analysis to study the coresidence decision of families. In 
particular, we estimated a finite mixture binary logit model to incorporate unobserved 
family heterogeneity and to address potential bias from irregular time intervals and 
attrition over time. Although we do not report the results here, a standard binary logit 
model without finite mixture components was also estimated at the family level, and the 
results were consistent with the other models. 
Conditional Logit Model 
New coresidence begins when a family reaches the decision to coreside according to 
latent family bargaining or an authoritative family member. To analyze this coresidence 
transition at the parent-child level, we denoted the transition to coresidence of parent i 
and child k between two observation periods by an indicator function, ( )1,0∈iky  
,,...,1 Ni =  iKk ,...,1= , where N was the total number of families in the sample and iK  
was the number of children, which varied by family. Each child represented an 
alternative to the parent. The parent could also choose to live independently of children 
(“outside option”). The size of the choice set for family i, therefore, was 1+iK .  
Assume that iky  is generated by the latent construct, *iky , specified as 
(1) ikikik Xy εβ +=
* , 
where ikX  is a vector that includes (1) family i ’s characteristics that are constant 
across children within a family, such as the parent’s age and family wealth, and (2) 
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child k ’s characteristics, such as the child’s age and education. β  is a vector of 
parameters measuring the effect of these characteristics on the transition probability. As 
a discrete choice model, only the relative difference of *iky  across alternatives is 
relevant, so we normalized the outside option as our reference alternative in which *iky  
takes a value of zero. The impact of any covariate, therefore, was interpreted as relative 
to living without a child.  
The logit model arises when ikε  is assumed to follow a type I extreme value 
distribution independently, conditional on ikX . The probability that child k  in family 


















Notice that (2) is conditional on sibling size, iK . In other words, we assumed that 
sibling size was given, and we abstracted away from a family’s fertility decision. 
Although it is possible that parents make fertility decisions expecting a child to provide 
future informal care, we expected that bias due to such behavior was less of an issue 
because we focused on the transition to coresidence. 
Finite Mixture Binary Logit Model (Family Level) 
Next, we studied the transition to coresidence at the family level. In this analysis, the 
child information was aggregated to the family level (e.g., the children’s average age 
and years of education). Although the above conditional logit model at the child level 
provided useful insights on the characteristics of individual children that influence the 
transition to coresidence, the family-level analysis had several advantages over the 
child-level analysis. First, the restriction on the substitution pattern among alternatives 
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imposed in the child-level logit model was no longer necessary in the family-level 
analysis. This restrictive property, known as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA), may not be appropriate given the interdependency of siblings’ location decisions 
(Maruyama and Johar 2013). Second, we could include elderly parents who started to 
live with more than one child in the family-level analysis. Third, families in which 
detailed information regarding individual children was missing were included in the 
family-level analysis. For these reasons, the estimation of the family-level model 
provided an opportunity to examine the robustness of our results.  
Instead of a standard binary logit model at the family level, we estimated a 
Heckman and Singer (1984)-type finite mixture logit model for the following two 
reasons. First, by non-parametrically incorporating unobservable family-level 
heterogeneity, this model allowed us to gain insights into the heterogeneity of families 
without imposing a priori sub-grouping. Second, the model reduced potential bias due 
to unobserved heterogeneity, which may occur even when unobserved heterogeneity is 
not correlated with any regressors. This potential bias is due to the sample selection that 
arises from attrition. Consider families with unobserved lower tendencies of 
coresidence. In our framework, all families lived independently of children in the base 
year, and families with a low tendency to coreside appeared in the data more often in 
later periods than did families with higher coresidence tendencies because the latter 
were more likely to begin coresidence and thus drop out of the sample in earlier periods. 
In a fairly general setting, the neglect of such unobserved heterogeneity may lead to an 
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underestimation of the coefficients (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 617-618).10 By 
explicitly incorporating the unobserved heterogeneity, the finite mixture model 
alleviated selection bias. 
Let an indicator variable, ( )1,0∈ity , denote the transition to coresidence between 
wave years t and t+1 by parent i with any of his/her children (hence, the child subscript 
k is dropped). Recall that the NUJLSOA surveys were conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, 
and 2006, with a longer interval between the last two waves. To adjust for the higher 
probability of new coresidence when survey intervals are longer, let It denote the 
number of years between the current and the next waves. Denoting the one-year 
transition probability under a binary logistic distribution by , the 
individual likelihood function can be written as 
(3) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ( )ittitt yIityIitititit XXXyl −⋅Λ−⋅Λ−= 1 )(1)(1-1 ,| βββ . 
The first square bracket term represents the probability that coresidence begins in any 
year between the two waves. Note that if It equals 1, this likelihood becomes the 
likelihood of a standard logit model with annual panel data. The estimates of β are 
interpreted as the effect of the covariates on the one-year transition probability. 
 We now introduce a two-component mixture into the likelihood function. We 
assume two unobserved types, or latent classes of families, across which β  may vary. 
For simplicity of presentation, assume that the types affect only the intercept term, such 
                                                 
10 The use of random and fixed effects models is the standard approach to overcome 
this bias. This approach, however, is not feasible in our framework because it requires 















that the types affect the probability of the transition to coresidence as an additive 
random shock, ( ) 221 , ℜ∈νν . Let jπ  be the probability associated with type j (mixing 
probability) and satisfying 10 << jπ  and 121 =+ππ . The likelihood of family i in 
type j at time t is defined as 
(4) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ( )ittitt yIjityIjitititjitj XXXyl −⋅+Λ−⋅+Λ−= 1 )(1)(1-1 ,|, νβνβνβ . 
The individual likelihood contribution of a two-component finite mixture model is 







,|,),,,,;,...,|,...,( νβπππννβ , 
where iT  is the last observational period of family i. Because the constant term in βitX  
is not identified, it is normalized to 0. This model can be estimated by solving 







. Introducing heterogeneity in other coefficient terms is a 
straightforward extension.11 
Results 
Conditional Logit: Full Sample Analysis 
The conditional logit results for the entire sample are shown in the first column of Table 
7. All shock variables were significant and increased the transition probability of 
coresidence. In addition to health deterioration and the loss of a spouse, the 
deterioration of spousal caring capability triggered coresidence, implying an important 
role of the spouse as a caregiver.  
[Table 7 here] 
Estimated coefficients on parent characteristics revealed that housing was an 
                                                 
11 We wrote our own likelihood function in STATA. The code is available upon request. 
21 
important predictor of coresidence. This strong housing effect was consistent with 
previous Japanese studies (Brown et al. 2002; Endo and Yoshida 2001; Iwamoto and 
Fukui 2001; Kim 2004; Tabuchi 2008; Takagi et al. 2007; Takagi and Silverstein 2011; 
Yamada 2006). Future coresidence was more likely when a parent lived either in a self-
owned (omitted category) or family-owned house than in a rented property.12 This 
house effect may capture the physical disadvantages of rental properties over owned 
houses for beginning coresidence, such as restrictions on renovation and a low 
availability of rental properties in Japan that can accommodate large, multigenerational 
families.13 The HouseFamily dummy indicated that the house was owned by a family 
member, but not by the parent or the spouse. Coresidence was more likely with this type 
of house than with a parent-owned house. Upon closer examination of the NUJLSOA, it 
was found that the majority of these houses, approximately 60%, were owned by a 
                                                 
12 Rented properties did not include assisted-living facilities because individuals living 
in these facilities were not included in our sample. 
13 Another explanation for the low propensity of coresidence of those who lived in 
rented properties is attrition bias because these parents were more likely to move when 
they started coresidence with children. Because the re-contact rate was lower for those 
who moved, the new coresidence by these parents was underrepresented. Our 
investigation of the relationship between rental property status, mobility, and the re-
contact rate found that this attrition bias was highly likely to exist, but the size of bias 
appeared much smaller than the size necessary to fully explain the estimated coefficient 
even if we used the most conservative estimates. We found no indication of such bias 
for AssetOther. 
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child. Hence, a plausible interpretation of this large effect of family-owned houses is 
pre-arranged coresidence as an inter vivos transfer. In Japan, houses are often purchased 
with substantial financial assistance from parents (Tabuchi 2008). Non-house wealth 
also had a positive effect on coresidence, suggesting additional compensation for 
children. 
The single marital status of a parent was associated with the transition to 
coresidence. Elderly fathers who were the eldest son and elderly mothers whose 
husbands were an eldest son were also more likely to begin coresidence. This eldest-son 
effect was consistent with previous studies (Nishioka 2000; Sakamoto 2006; Takagi et 
al. 2007; Wakabayashi and Horioka 2009) indicating the significance of the Japanese 
primogenital family system, in which the eldest son’s family is the “main family” and 
the eldest son inherits assets such as land or a house as well as the surname from the 
parents. Parental age, baseline health conditions, marital status, and education were 
significant predictors of future coresidence. In contrast to the findings of Takagi et al. 
(2007) and Takagi and Silverstein (2011) that mothers were more likely to live with 
their children, the coefficient on Female was not significant, but this finding was not 
surprising. Because the vast majority of single parents in our sample were widowed 
mothers, Spouse captured the effect of being a widowed mother. Hence, what Female 
captured was predominantly which member of an elderly couple was the survey 
respondent. Regarding parental occupation, Wakabayashi and Horioka (2009) reported 
a positive association between coresidence and occupations with strong family 
nepotism, such as self-employment and farming. Farmer and SelfEmployed both 
showed positive coefficients, but only Farmer was significant. 
The estimated coefficients on child variables suggested the costs and benefits of 
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coresidence to children. Future coresidence was more likely with a young, unmarried 
child who lived nearby. These children may have lower opportunity costs of relocation, 
coresidence, and future caregiving. Consistent with this interpretation, Hanaoka and 
Norton (2008) found that the presence of unmarried children reduced single parents’ use 
of formal care more than the presence of married children did. Among married children, 
daughters were more likely to coreside with parents than sons were. There existed a 
strong tendency for coresidence with the eldest son (but not with the eldest daughter), 
and its magnitude was much larger than the effect of fathers as the first son. This result 
suggested a preference for living with the eldest son regardless of whether the family is 
a “main family” or a “branch family.” The effect of grandchildren depended on their 
age. Although the number of school-age grandchildren lowered the probability of the 
transition to coresidence, the presence of preschool grandchildren increased the 
transition probability, which may suggest the role of elderly parents in providing 
childcare.  
Overall, these results confirmed the following four findings, which are 
consistent with the findings in the literature. First, intergenerational coresidence often 
begins in response to the heightened care needs of parents, including the loss of a 
spouse as well as their health deterioration. Second, coresidence is more likely to occur 
for parents who have sizable assets. Third, the Japanese traditions of intergenerational 
inheritance of the house and son preference are still prevalent. Fourth, differences in 
coresidence propensity across children’s characteristics indicate that care and attention 
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provided by children may not be unconditional.14 
Conditional Logit: Subsample Analysis 
The reciprocal nature of coresidence and the conditions for care and attention may vary 
across families. We applied the logit framework to two sub-groups: married parents and 
widowed mothers. We did not attempt the regression for widowed fathers because there 
were only 181 widowed father observations. The results are reported in the second and 
third columns of Table 7. 
The results of the shock variables indicated that although heightened ADL care 
needs were a critical factor in inducing coresidence for widowed mothers, the 
coefficients of the health-shock variables were all insignificant for married parents. 
What triggered coresidence for married parents was the loss of current or future care 
provision by a spouse, either through the death or the deteriorating health of a spouse. 
This finding illuminated the role of the spouse as a primary caregiver and the position of 
a child as a replacement caregiver. 
Coresidence was more likely for widowed mothers who were less educated, 
lived in a family-owned house, and had liquid assets. For married parents, house 
ownership played an important role, but other assets did not. Children who coresided 
                                                 
14 In this study, we did not attempt to interpret the coefficients of the two wave 
dummies. On the one hand, they may reflect changes in the composition of the 
population due to attrition. On the other hand, the time trend may be influenced by the 
introduction of the public Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) in 2000. Nevertheless, 
Tamiya et al. (2011) found that the introduction of LTCI had a limited effect on 
reducing family informal care.  
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with married parents tended to be young and unmarried, but children’s age and marital 
status did not affect the transition probability for widowed mothers. 
Finite Mixture Binary Logit Model  
The above subsample analysis was based on our presumption of the distinctive nature of 
married parents and widowed mothers. We then applied a two-component mixture 
model to the entire sample to identify family heterogeneity based not on a priori 
grouping but on the empirical distribution in the data. Because this was a family-level 
model, we aggregated the child characteristics to the family level (e.g., the average 
number of years of education of children and the presence of at least one unmarried son 
or daughter).   
[Table 8 here] 
The results are shown in Table 8. The first column reports the full-sample logit 
results for comparison purposes. The last two columns report the results from the 
mixture logit. The upper panel of Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients of the 
variables for which we introduced the two-component family-specific heterogeneity. 
The lower panel shows the coefficients in the common part, which were assumed to 
have the same effect for both types. The selection of variables for which we introduced 
heterogeneity was based on interest and estimation tractability. In particular, the 
identification of model parameters became challenging when we introduced 
heterogeneity for a variable with insufficient variation. For example, we did not 
introduce heterogeneity for HouseFamily because this dummy variable applied to less 
than 5% of our sample. Comparing estimated coefficients in the common part with 
those of the standard logit model provided a robustness check. The differences were 
generally modest, and the logit and finite mixture models offered overall consistent 
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findings. Our results were fairly robust in removing the mixture component from any 
variable in our current specification. 
The estimated finite mixture model identified two distinct types of families, with 
72.5% classified as Type 1 and 27.5% classified as Type 2. The differences in the 
coefficient estimates across types reflect the heterogeneity in the coresidence decisions 
of Japanese families. Type 2 families had a smaller constant term than Type 1 families, 
but when evaluated at sample mean values, Type 1 families had, on average, a smaller 
probability of transition to coresidence than their Type 2 counterparts. Type 1 families 
were more likely to start coresidence when the parent was an eldest son (or a spouse of 
an eldest son), was less educated, was more severely disabled at the baseline, had 
younger children, and lived in a self-owned house with a higher housing value. For 
Type 2 families, coresidence was more likely to occur when the parent was widowed, 
had better subjective health, and had assets other than a house. 
Discussion 
The heterogeneity identified by the finite mixture model exhibits similarities 
with the subsample analysis. Important factors are parental housing conditions and 
children’s age for Type 1 and parental widowhood and non-house wealth for Type 2. 
Although the setups are different and the two models do not necessarily reflect the same 
type of heterogeneity, both models suggest that a parent’s marital status is significantly 
related to heterogeneity in the mode of reciprocity within a family. Specifically, Type I 
parents are similar to married parents in that the transition to coresidence is associated 
positively with house ownership and housing wealth, negatively with children’s age, 
and insignificantly with non-house assets. Likewise, Type II parents are similar to 
widowed mothers in that the initiation of coresidence is associated positively with non-
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house assets and is insignificantly associated with house ownership, housing wealth, 
and children’s age. In addition, Type II parents are less likely to start coresidence when 
living with a spouse and thus are similar to widowed mothers in our sample. 
The results from both models suggest that factors associated with new 
coresidence vary across families. We argue that these factors reflect the costs and 
benefits of coresidence to children. For married parents, coresidence typically begins 
when sharing a house with parents is attractive for children. Better housing conditions 
make coresidence more likely, allowing young and unmarried children to rely on 
parents’ resources. Parents can also enjoy care and attention from children, but the 
presence of a healthy spouse would decrease the current or future caregiving burden for 
children. From this perspective, coresidence for married parents may be regarded as a 
means of securing children’s long-term commitment for the burden of future care (both 
further health deterioration and loss of spouse) by offering an environment that is 
attractive to children and the potential deed to the residential house. These factors 
reiterate the importance of a house in mediating intergenerational transfers. 
However, married/unmarried children and young/old children are all equally 
likely to start living with widowed mothers. Although this finding appears to suggest 
that children’s altruism dictates the opportunity costs and benefits of children for 
widowed mothers, our results also suggest that coresidence with widowed mothers 
involves different forms of reciprocity. Coresiding widowed mothers tend to be rich in 
liquid assets and, if healthy, may be better able to provide help with household chores 
and care for grandchildren compared with fathers and married mothers who must take 
care of their husbands. 
Our results do not exclude other possible motives of children for providing care 
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and attention to their parents, such as altruism and social norms. Additionally, children 
may compensate parents for the financial and time investments they received in 
childhood. Nevertheless, our results illuminate the importance of wealth transfers from 
parents to children in later life in the formation of intergenerational coresidence. These 
results differ from those of American studies reporting an insignificant association 
between parental wealth and children’s provision of care and attention to parents 
(Brown 2007; Nakamura and Maruyama 2012; Perozek 1998; Pezzin and Schone 1999; 
Sloan et al. 1997; 2002). The parent-child relationship in Japan may be characterized by 
higher levels of filial support for parents and parental support for children. Despite this 
difference, however, our findings are consistent with various studies of countries other 
than Japan that find evidence of reciprocity in transfers between elderly parents and 
adult children (Bernheim et al. 1985; Chan 2005; Cox 1987; Henretta et al. 1997; Johar 
and Maruyama 2011; Koh and Macdonald 2006; Norton and Van Houtven 2006). 
Conclusions 
Intergenerational coresidence and traditional informal care provision are declining in 
Japan and in other aging societies. The disabled elderly live longer, and family 
caregivers are older. The relative number of children is decreasing, and children’s 
opportunity costs of caring for parents are growing. Developed countries emphasize the 
efficient use of formal care and community-based care. Nevertheless, care and attention 
provided by children remains important for the well-being of elderly, particularly 
widowed, individuals. 
This study provides a first step toward deepening our knowledge about 
reciprocity in intergenerational exchanges, particularly parent-children coresidence that 
involves care and attention provided by children. We find considerable heterogeneity in 
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the determinants of the transition to coresidence across Japanese families. Our results 
suggest that the way in which elderly parents compensate their children for care and 
attention depends on the costs and benefits to the children for coresidence and service 
provision. There are two distinct types of coresidence in Japanese families. For the more 
common type of family, new coresidence tends to involve young, unmarried children 
and married parents. In this type of family, the main mode of transfer appears to be 
housing assets. The other, less common type has a higher tendency of transition to 
coresidence. When this type of family starts coresidence, it typically involves widowed 
mothers, and reciprocity seems to be achieved through financial assets other than a 
house.  
This study has the following implications for future studies on the parent-child 
relationship. First, our finding of significant family heterogeneity highlights the 
importance of an analytical framework that can account for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, such as finite-mixture models. Second, our finding of the important role 
of parental compensation requires future studies of reciprocity in family decisions 
regarding informal care. The high rate of intergenerational coresidence in Japan likely 
reflects intergenerational reciprocity or mutual altruism rather than one-sided, 
unconditional, and self-sacrificing filial altruism or social norms. Third, the findings 
that non-house wealth and health promote coresidence for widowed mothers suggest 
that widowed mothers may lack care and attention from their children when they are 
physically frail and poor in wealth. Ways of safeguarding the welfare of such vulnerable 
populations remain a pressing question for policy makers and researchers. 
Children’s support for elderly parents can take forms other than coresidence, 
such as distant informal care and financial assistance for formal care. Additionally, 
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recent studies have questioned the effectiveness of intergenerational coresidence in 
promoting elderly parents’ longevity (Johar and Maruyama 2013; Maruyama 2012). 
However, similar reciprocity could exist in these dimensions of old-age support from 
children. Analysis of a broader spectrum of filial support is a task we leave for future 
research.   
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Table 1: Living Arrangements across Socio-Demographic Groups 





Living alone 12.0% 9.8% 0.2% 32.8% 25.7% 
Spouse only 31.5% 31.0% 47.5%   
Spouse & child 29.0% 31.2% 47.7%   
Spouse & others 2.8% 2.7% 4.2%   
Single & child 21.6% 23.2% 0.4% 62.3% 68.6% 
Single & others 3.2% 2.1% 0.1% 5.0% 5.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 





Living alone 14.8% 12.6% 0.6% 39.6% 32.7% 
Spouse only 35.2% 34.9% 53.3%   
Spouse & child 26.3% 27.9% 42.6%   
Spouse & others 1.9% 2.0% 3.1%   
Single & child 19.3% 20.5% 0.3% 54.3% 61.4% 
Single & others 2.6% 2.1% 0.1% 6.1% 5.9% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, based on 4,997 and 3,414 respondents in Waves 1 and 4, respectively, 
with sampling weights applied. Except for the first column titled “all,” the figures are based on 
individuals with at least one surviving child. Parents classified as “living with a child” may also live with 



















Living alone 83.85% 3.04% 0.27% 4.58% 3.61% 21.90% 
Spouse only 1.01% 84.30% 6.36% 27.62% 0.38% 0.00% 
Spouse & child 0.00% 5.27% 80.46% 15.67% 0.31% 0.00% 
Spouse & others 0.00% 0.95% 1.75% 38.06% 0.07% 0.00% 
Single & child 9.38% 0.75% 5.75% 2.59% 84.09% 11.69% 
Single & others 1.25% 0.00% 0.05% 0.60% 4.16% 40.07% 
Death 4.51% 5.68% 5.37% 10.89% 7.39% 26.33% 















Living alone 86.46% 4.30% 0.37% 0.68% 3.25% 14.74% 
Spouse only 1.20% 87.41% 7.88% 25.34% 0.00% 0.00% 
Spouse & child 0.00% 3.53% 80.68% 16.47% 0.49% 0.00% 
Spouse & others 0.00% 0.69% 1.71% 41.87% 0.00% 0.00% 
Single & child 5.19% 0.16% 4.87% 0.85% 84.03% 12.67% 
Single & others 2.18% 0.06% 0.00% 3.37% 4.51% 40.34% 
Death 4.97% 3.86% 4.49% 11.42% 7.72% 32.25% 















Living alone 81.14% 5.43% 0.30% 1.42% 4.75% 18.13% 
Spouse only 0.43% 81.20% 8.90% 30.66% 0.18% 0.00% 
Spouse & child 0.36% 4.90% 77.91% 9.38% 0.52% 0.00% 
Spouse & others 0.00% 1.08% 1.78% 40.77% 0.00% 0.00% 
Single & child 8.38% 1.01% 3.82% 0.00% 77.52% 16.16% 
Single & others 1.22% 0.18% 0.22% 1.51% 4.68% 28.33% 
Death 8.46% 6.18% 7.07% 16.27% 12.34% 37.37% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, weighted using sampling weights. The population studied is elderly 
parents with at least one surviving child in the base year. “Others” include anyone other than the parent’s 
own child and spouse. 
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Table 3: Parental Reasons for Living with Their Children 
Reasons (Multiple answers allowed) Male Female 
1. It’s what my child wants 22.70% 20.14% 
2. My child is not married 19.22% 14.13% 
3. To have my child take care of me 18.57% 23.04% 
4. It’s what I want 18.17% 9.67% 
5. I can provide a house for my child 14.62% 13.50% 
6. To financially support my child 13.12% 5.83% 
7. To receive financial support from my child 13.01% 11.03% 
8. Being with my child supports me mentally 11.72% 16.46% 
9. I can give my child advice 9.70% 8.90% 
10. To help raise grandchildren 8.61% 6.00% 
11. I can receive advice from my child 7.22% 3.31% 
12. My child is not independent yet 6.08% 4.01% 
13. To help with housework 5.46% 6.69% 
14. Because I want to be there for my child 5.10% 2.78% 
15. I have a newly built house 3.55% 5.54% 
16. My spouse passed away 1.26% 11.08% 
17. Other reasons 20.44% 17.80% 
Number of observations 125 186 
Note: From the NUJLSOA data (Waves 1 to 4), weighted by sampling weights. Respondents are those 
who began coresidence with a child within the last two years. 
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Table 4: The Number of Observations Used in the Family-Level Analysis 
Year 










1999 – 2001 1,231 85 (6.9%) 910 56 (6.2%) 251 20 (8.0%) 
2001 – 2003 1,097 49 (4.5%) 799 32 (4.0%) 245 15 (6.1%) 
2003 – 2006 1,185 95 (8.0%) 901 62 (6.9%) 226 27 (12.0%) 
Total 3,513 229 (6.5%) 2,610 150 (5.8%) 722 62 (8.6%) 
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Table 5: Definitions of Variables 
Dependent variable 
CoresNext =1 if parent begins coresidence with at least one child; 0 otherwise (family-level model). 
C_CoresNext =1 if parent begins coresidence with a particular child; 0 otherwise (child-level model). 
 
Explanatory variables: shocks between the base and following periods 
Lostspouse 
=1 if spouse departs; 0 otherwise. Divorce and separation included (though extremely 
rare). 
HS_physical 
=1 if major deterioration in the ability to perform any of the interviewed physical 
activities; 0 otherwise. 
HS_ADL 
=1 if major deterioration in the ability to perform any of the interviewed ADL 
activities; 0 otherwise. 
HS_spouse =1 if deterioration in the caring ability of the spouse living together; 0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables: characteristics of the elderly parent at the base period  
Age Age of the elderly parent. 
Female =1 if mother; 0 otherwise. 
1stson =1 if the parent or the spouse is an eldest son; 0 otherwise. 
Spouse =1 if living with spouse; 0 otherwise. 
YearEducation Number of years in school. 
Rural =1 if living in a rural area; 0 otherwise. 
Physical Index 0-10 of 9 physical activity items (the larger the weaker). 
ADL Index 0-10 of 7 basic activities of daily living (ADL) items (the larger the weaker). 
SubjectiveHealth =0 if very healthy / healthy; 1 if average; 2 if unhealthy / very unhealthy. 
Work =1 if working; 0 otherwise. 
Farmer =1 if either the parent or the spouse is a farmer, or was a farmer if retired. 
SelfEmployed =1 if either the parent or the spouse is self-employed, or was self-employed if retired. 
HouseWealth a 
Estimated value of the house that is owned by the parent or the spouse (in 1,000,000 
Japanese Yen). 
HouseFamily a =1 if living in a house owned by someone else in the family or relatives; 0 otherwise. 
HouseRent =1 if living on a rent basis. 
AssetOther 
=1 if the parental income is above the median income and one of the top two sources 
of income is real estate properties, marketable securities, savings, or benefits from life 
insurance. 
Explanatory variables: individual child characteristics at the base period b (child-level model) 
C_Age Age of child. 
C_NumSibling Number of siblings. 
C_Onechild =1 if child is the only child; 0 otherwise. 
C_1stchild, C_1stson =1 if child is the first child / the first son; 0 otherwise. 
C_MarrDtr =1 if child is a married daughter; 0 otherwise. 
C_UnmarrSon, C_UnmarrDtr =1 if child is an unmarried son / daughter; 0 otherwise. 
C_CaresInLaw =1 if coresides with parent-in-law; 0 otherwise. 
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C_CaresInLawMarrMiss 
=1 if marital information is missing (in-law information is also 
missing); 0 otherwise. 
C_YearEduc Years of education of child. 
C_Near =1 if child lives in the same municipality; 0 otherwise. 
C_Sick 
=1 if child is described by the parent as "not healthy enough to take 
care of someone"; 0 otherwise. 
C_NumGrandChild Number of children. 
C_NumGrandChildSmall Number of children of preschool age. 
Explanatory variables: aggregate child characteristics at the base period b (family-level model) 
AC_AvgAge Average age of children. 
AC_Onechild =1 if parent has only one surviving child; 0 otherwise. 
AC_NumChild Number of surviving children. 
AC_UnmarSon, AC_UnmarDtr =1 if there is an unmarried son / daughter; 0 otherwise. 
AC_YearEduc Average number of years of education of children. 
AC_Near =1 if at least one child lives in the same municipality; 0 otherwise. 
AC_NumGrandChild Number of grandchildren. 
AC_NumGrandChildSmall Number of grandchildren of preschool age. 
Note: Two dummy variables are also used for the periods 2001-2003 and 2003-2006, with the 1999-2001 
period being the reference group. a: House ownership includes condominiums and townhouses. Joint 
ownership is included. The difference between regular ownership and HouseFamily is whether the parent 
or the spouse has ownership. b: Children include step- and foster children but not children-in-law (i.e., 
children's spouses). 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics  
 
Note: Based on 3,513 parent-period observations (family level), except for the variables 
with *, which are based on 9,140 parent-period-child observations (child level).   
All Couples Widowed mothers




Lostspouse 0.040 0.197 0.050 0.217 0.133 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
HS_physical 0.053 0.223 0.046 0.210 0.107 0.310 0.055 0.227 0.161 0.371
HS_ADL 0.017 0.131 0.016 0.125 0.053 0.225 0.008 0.087 0.113 0.319
SpHS_careable 0.105 0.307 0.139 0.346 0.193 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parent
Female 0.483 0.500 0.371 0.483 0.413 0.494
Age 74.831 5.911 73.991 5.583 74.491 5.962 77.196 6.182 78.044 5.567
1stson 0.422 0.494 0.436 0.496 0.480 0.501 0.355 0.479 0.452 0.502
Educ 9.770 2.729 10.108 2.768 9.840 2.507 8.815 2.308 8.081 2.638
Rural 0.311 0.463 0.317 0.465 0.360 0.482 0.282 0.450 0.274 0.450
Wspouse 0.743 0.437 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Physical 0.584 1.184 0.498 1.121 0.585 1.181 0.877 1.378 0.857 1.162
ADL 0.146 0.692 0.127 0.661 0.219 0.992 0.197 0.747 0.180 0.497
Subhealth 0.907 0.764 0.891 0.756 0.913 0.794 0.965 0.773 0.935 0.765
Work 0.236 0.425 0.258 0.437 0.307 0.463 0.150 0.357 0.129 0.338
Farmer 0.156 0.363 0.171 0.376 0.200 0.401 0.097 0.296 0.161 0.371
SelfEmp 0.212 0.409 0.235 0.424 0.313 0.465 0.130 0.337 0.097 0.298
HouseWealth 34.099 51.161 37.018 52.413 49.055 59.029 23.703 46.786 22.172 43.435
FamilyHouse 0.044 0.206 0.016 0.125 0.087 0.282 0.115 0.319 0.274 0.450
HouseRent 0.161 0.368 0.135 0.342 0.033 0.180 0.258 0.438 0.210 0.410
AssetOther 0.223 0.416 0.440 0.430 0.293 0.457 0.135 0.342 0.226 0.422
Children*
C_Age 45.709 6.866 44.555 6.251 44.586 6.791 50.225 6.950 50.113 7.321
C_NumSibling 1.591 1.006 1.520 0.885 1.325 0.839 1.843 1.320 1.583 1.217
C_Onechild 0.088 0.283 0.076 0.266 0.111 0.316 0.121 0.327 0.208 0.410
C_1stchild 0.451 0.500 0.452 0.498 0.530 0.501 0.443 0.497 0.479 0.505
C_1stson 0.334 0.472 0.336 0.472 0.564 0.498 0.307 0.461 0.521 0.505
C_MarrDtr 0.462 0.499 0.464 0.500 0.249 0.434 0.473 0.500 0.375 0.489
C_UnmarrSon 0.067 0.250 0.066 0.249 0.162 0.370 0.053 0.224 0.021 0.144
C_UnmarrDtr 0.048 0.213 0.043 0.202 0.128 0.336 0.059 0.236 0.063 0.245
C_CoresInLaw 0.061 0.240 0.062 0.241 0.026 0.159 0.061 0.239 0.042 0.202
C_CoresInLawMarrMiss 0.331 0.471 0.330 0.470 0.282 0.452 0.342 0.475 0.292 0.459
C_YearEduc 13.523 2.153 13.694 2.124 13.718 2.266 12.982 2.151 12.396 1.854
C_Near 0.342 0.475 0.328 0.470 0.590 0.494 0.377 0.485 0.646 0.483
C_Sick 0.031 0.174 0.031 0.173 0.051 0.222 0.030 0.172 0.063 0.245
C_NumGrandChild 1.735 1.056 1.714 1.059 1.316 1.164 1.870 1.009 1.854 0.850
C_NumGrandChildSmall 0.201 0.526 0.234 0.560 0.239 0.567 0.071 0.329 0.188 0.491
No coresidence New coresidence No coresidence New coresidence
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Table 7: Conditional Logit 
  All   Married   Widowed mothers 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Shocks       
Lostspouse 1.330 4.13*** 1.376 4.17***   
HS_physical 0.601 1.88† 0.452 1.12 0.840 1.18 
HS_ADL 1.186 2.53* 0.723 1.25 3.378 2.87** 
HS_spouse 0.492 1.84† 0.539 2.00*   
Parent       
Age 0.069 2.89** 0.075 2.52* 0.012 0.23 
Female 0.150 0.76 0.250 1.08   
1stson 0.327 1.97* 0.310 1.51 0.687 1.84† 
Spouse -0.763 -3.44***     
YearEducation -0.086 -2.34* -0.043 -1.02 -0.261 -3.07** 
Rural -0.125 -0.61 0.212 0.86 -0.765 -1.72† 
Physical -0.234 -2.07* -0.140 -1.04 -0.547 -1.95† 
ADL 0.371 2.73** 0.325 2.09* 0.493 1.11 
SubjectiveHealth -0.087 -0.72 -0.013 -0.09 -0.291 -1.11 
Work -0.091 -0.41 0.051 0.19 -0.529 -0.94 
Farmer 0.473 1.84† 0.080 0.25 0.792 1.43 
SelfEmployed 0.108 0.5 0.082 0.33 0.131 0.19 
HouseWealth 0.002 1.5 0.002 1.58 0.005 1.3 
HouseFamily 1.394 4.92*** 1.853 4.40*** 1.992 3.99*** 
HouseRent -0.937 -2.96** -1.956 -3.17** 0.019 0.04 
AssetOther 0.485 2.45* 0.252 1.06 1.059 2.22* 
Child variables       
C_Age -0.058 -2.74** -0.056 -2.07* -0.032 -0.74 
C_NumSibling -0.170 -1.48 -0.261 -1.58 0.114 0.56 
C_onlychild -0.136 -0.44 -0.230 -0.57 0.932 1.48 
C_1stchild 0.008 0.04 0.124 0.51 -0.480 -1.16 
C_1stson 1.467 4.40*** 1.539 3.57*** 2.103 2.61** 
C_MarrDtr 0.670 1.93* 0.709 1.56 1.151 1.42 
C_UnmarrSon 0.659 2.03* 1.011 2.71** -2.174 -1.54 
C_UnmarrDtr 1.559 3.58*** 2.212 4.12*** 0.145 0.11 
C_CaresInLaw -0.546 -1.15 -0.546 -0.89 0.103 0.13 
C_CaresInLawMarrMiss -0.415 -1.12 0.026 0.06 -2.210 -1.77† 
C_YearEduc -0.062 -1.43 -0.056 -1.06 -0.167 -1.69† 
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C_Near 1.120 6.59*** 1.142 5.44*** 0.995 2.77** 
C_Sick 0.422 1.11 0.507 1.11 0.801 0.99 
C_NumGrandChild -0.214 -2.44* -0.270 -2.37* -0.108 -0.63 
C_NumGrandChildSmall 0.317 1.92† 0.349 1.77* 0.681 1.94† 
Time       
wave2 -0.936 -2.61** -0.437 -1.05 -2.483 -1.98* 
wave3 -0.194 -0.57 0.030 0.08 -1.035 -0.85 
Constant -4.968 -3.14** -7.289 -3.81*** 1.184 0.34 
N 9,140   6,932   1,784   
Log L -681.13  -455.01  -149.559  
Pseudo R2 0.788   0.814   0.757   
Note: †, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are used. The sample size is based on parent-child observations; 2,841 parents 




Table 8: Two-Component Mixture Binary Logit 
  Logit   Mixture logit     
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
      MIXTURE      
   Type 1  Type 2  
Age 0.033 1.45 0.048 0.86 0.062 1.1 
1stson 0.287 1.95† 1.236 2.24* -0.382 -0.92 
Spouse -0.627 -3.11** 0.126 0.22 -1.090 -3.0** 
YearEducation -0.053 -1.61 -0.162 -1.96† -0.018 -0.26 
Physical -0.103 -1.19 -0.053 -0.29 -0.024 -0.13 
ADL 0.175 1.37 0.391 1.87† -1.275 -1.39 
SubjectiveHealth -0.078 -0.72 0.459 0.82 -0.406 -1.73† 
HouseWealth 0.002 1.91† 0.010 2.98** -0.003 -0.83 
HouseRent -0.858 -3.1** -2.926 -2.40* -0.598 -1.31 
AssetOther 0.478 2.75** -0.233 -0.36 0.953 2.47* 
AC_AvgAge -0.023 -1.05 -0.130 -2.52* 0.005 0.1 
Constant -3.026 -2.18* -1.874 -0.63 -5.379 -1.99† 
Share    0.725  0.275  
     COMMON   
      Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Shocks       
Lostspouse 1.165 4.07*** 1.333 3.97***   
HS_physical 0.571 2.01* 0.526 1.62   
HS_ADL 1.236 3.14** 1.536 3.38***   
HS_spouse 0.509 2.24* 0.626 2.49*   
Parent       
Female 0.116 0.65 0.245 1.18   
Rural -0.097 -0.53 -0.148 -0.7   
Work 0.129 0.7 0.168 0.75   
Farmer 0.253 1.13 0.352 1.35   
SelfEmployed 0.299 1.62 0.336 1.56   
HouseFamily 1.266 4.86*** 1.767 4.75***   
Child       
AC_Onechild -0.198 -0.79 -0.351 -1.14   
AC_NumChild 0.082 0.7 0.078 0.55   
AC_UnmarSon 0.524 2.66** 0.612 2.5*   
AC_UnmarDtr 0.543 2.73** 0.723 2.89**   
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AC_YearEduc -0.080 -1.66† -0.103 -1.83†   
AC_Near 0.793 4.96*** 0.969 4.87***   
AC_NumGrandChild -0.103 -2.34* -0.126 -2.44*   
AC_NumGrandChildSmall 0.089 1.17 0.084 0.82   
Time       
wave2 -0.540 -2.83** -0.548 -2.51*   
wave3 0.121 0.72 -0.229 -1.22   
N 3,513   3,513       
Log L -750.855  -734.531    
Chi-Sq 217.51  112.74    
Pseudo R2 0.1132           
Note: †,*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
